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Swaps Ahoy! Should Regulators Voyage into
Unknown Waters?
MARC A. HORWITZ
Risk and volatility have been constants throughout the history of the
financial markets. In an attempt to mitigate the effects of market
fluctuations on risk-averse parties, private investment firms have sculpted an
array of innovative financial instruments.' These investment firms vie with
each other and with organized exchanges for the investment dollar, offering
the allure of a customized and more flexible financial product. The
explosion of new financial instruments into the marketplace has fostered
heated debate among regulators, scholars, and industry leaders regarding the
necessity of regulation for these new products.2 Federal regulatory bodies,
unable to agree on a single agency to oversee these instruments, have
responded with a hodgepodge of statutes and regulations which either
exempt the instruments entirely from regulatory domain or skirt meaningful
provisions which directly address the potential abuses of this booming
market. The sheer size of the market for new financial instruments and the
profound impact which this market potentially can wield upon the world
economy begs the question of whether an uncoordinated free market
approach is the optimal form of regulation. Should the U.S. unilaterally
regulate these instruments? If so, who should possess regulatory
jurisdiction? And to what degree should the regulatory bodies assert their
jurisdictional powers? This note will focus on swap transactions, and will
attempt to unmask their current status in the domestic and global regulatory
paradigms. Finally, this note will conclude that despite the dearth of
regulation, the dynamics of the swap market dictate that more stringent
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, B.A., 1991, University
of Michigan. In light of the constant state of flux of the swap market, I must include the caveat that this
note only contains research as of Jan 1, 1994.
1. These "innovative" financial instruments carry the moniker "derivatives" because they derive
their value from other assets (e.g., debt, foreign currency, and commodities). While some derivatives
trade on organized exchanges, others are customized for purchase and sale over-the-counter (OTC).
Safety and Soundness Issues Associated With Bank Derivative Activities: Hearing Before the House
Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, Federal News Service, Oct. 29, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File, at *3 [hereinafter House Hearing].
2. Id. at *1.
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regulation may not be the outcome-maximizing solution. More importantly,
the fact that swap transactions invariably transcend national boundaries
demands that any effective regulation be a concert of the global swap
community.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SEVERAL FINANCIAL PRODUCTS
A. Futures
Although grain futures have been traded at the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBT) since 1848,' financial futures are a relatively recent innovation. In
the 1970's, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) led a movement
among futures exchanges toward creating futures contracts4 from various
financial instruments. Futures contracts allow parties who plan to dispose of
or acquire commodities at a known point in the future to hedge against their
risk and guarantee the prevailing market price. Today, exchanges worldwide
trade a spectrum of financial futures contracts, including foreign currencies,
debt instruments, and market indices, with new contracts sprouting
constantly. Futures contracts afford the risk averse party two primary
benefits. First, parties to futures contracts need not supply the full contract
price upon formation of the contract. Rather, the purchaser and the seller
must only fulfill margin requirements while maintaining their open position.
Margin requirements amount to a mere fraction of the contract price.5
Second, the futures contract insulates both parties from the risk of future
price fluctuations. By entering into the contract, the parties lock in the
prevailing market price at the time of the transaction as the price that will
be paid upon delivery.
Futures contracts contain several features which serve as drawbacks to
certain customers seeking an outlet to assume their risk. First, futures
contracts are only available for the limited range of products traded on
3. See JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1859-1905, at 23 (1979). The CBT
was founded in 1848, but was not actually incorporated in its present form until 1859. Id. at 40. Futures
trading from 1848-1859 was chaotic (even relative to current trading) and disorganized. The CBT did
not actually function as an organized exchange until 1859. Id. at 25.
4. A futures contract obligates a buyer to deliver to a seller a stated amount of a commodity
at a fixed price at a specified delivery date. PHILIP McBIUDE JOHNSON AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
COMMODITIES REGULATION, § 1.03 (2d ed. 1989). See also infra text accompanying notes 29-31.
5. See id., at § 1.10; THOMAS A. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND
OPTIONS MARKETS, § 1.20 (1992).
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organized exchanges and cannot be altered in any way to fit the particular
needs of a party. Second, futures exchanges set the delivery dates for their
contracts. Typically, exchanges only list financial futures contracts for
delivery on one day every two to three months. Thus, consumers to whom
date of delivery is of concern either must hold the commodity until the
desired use date or delay the ultimate use date until delivery. Choosing the
former can incapacitate a huge capital reserve for the period of the lag if
another adequate investment vehicle is unavailable for the interim. Opting
for the latter may prove infeasible in light of the underlying purpose of the
contract. Third, the futures exchange fixes the amount of the commodity
which encompasses each contract.6 Exchanges thereby limit the customer
to hedging its risk only in an amount that constitutes a multiple of an
exchange traded contract.7 Finally, exchanges offer contracts for delivery
dates which span a relatively short time frame. While contracts with
delivery dates one year, and sometimes two years, out from the present
exist, typically contracts with delivery dates more than six months out fail
to attract sufficient investor attention to provide an active and liquid
market.8 Thus, the futures contract may not be the ideal outlet for the
consumer who desires to mitigate long-term risk.
B. Options
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a prescribed
quantity of an asset at a specified price at or prior to a fixed future date.9
6. For example, the International Monetary Mart of the CME has fixed contracts for commonly
traded currency futures and options futures as follows:
Japanese Yen I contract = 12,500,000 Yen
Deutsche Marks 1 contract = 125,000 Marks
Swiss Francs I contract = 125,000 Francs
British Pounds I contract = 62,500 Pounds
Canadian Dollar I contract = 100,000 Canadian Dollars
See WALL ST. J. daily price quotes.
7. The Mid America Commodity Exchange offers smaller contract sizes than other exchanges.
For financial futures, contract sizes constitute one-half those of the CME. See supra note 6.
8. Crude oil futures are one notable exception. In an attempt to attract swap participants into
the futures markets, the New York Mercantile Exchange extended its delivery dates for crude oil futures
out to three years, in 1990, up from its previous level of 18 months. Currently, swap traders comprise
the bulk of the market in these new contracts. Laurie Morse, Survey of Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
8, 1992, at IV.
9. Andrew Giles, Towards Diversification, in REGULATIONS GOVERNING DERIVATIVES, AN
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE 4 (Josephine Carr ed., 1992); JOHNSON AND HAzEN, supra note 4 at 22-23.
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A call option grants the right to buy an asset; a put option confers the right
to sell an asset.' ° In order to gamer the right to buy or sell the asset, the
option purchaser must pay a premium. If the purchaser decides not to
exercise the option and declines to purchase or sell the asset when the
option date expires, the purchaser loses only the premium paid." The
feature of a loss ceiling renders options more attractive than futures to many
investors, since futures carry unlimited loss potential. Each major
commodity exchange lists options for virtually all commodities it trades.
However, options listed on organized exchanges share the same four
drawbacks with futures contracts.
Futures and options contracts differ from securities in that futures and
options contracts are commonly referred to as a zero-sum game. The
contracts and the parties who enter into them create no new wealth. Rather,
the contracts merely reallocate risk among the parties. 2 Securities, on the
other hand, raise capital for a particular entity. Since these funds are
employed for expansion and other productive ends, securities indirectly
contribute to the creation of new wealth. 3
C. Swaps
Since futures and options contracts fail to fulfill the needs of all,
investment firms have responded with innovative products which cater to the
individual demands of consumers. One such product is a swap transaction,
10. Giles, supra note 9, at 4.
11. To illustrate, say X wants to sell 1,000 widgets on June I of next year at $5 per widget. X
can enter into an option contract with Y, whereby X promises to pay Y $100 for the right to sell the
1,000 widgets to Y at $5 per widget on June 1. $5 is the strike price, and $100 (or 10 cents per widget)
is the premium for the put option. If, on June 1, the market price of widgets is below $5, X will exercise
the option and sell the 1,000 widgets to Y at $5. In this scenario, X receives $5,000 as the contract
price, and loses the $100 premium. If, however, the market for widgets trades above $5, X may choose
not to exercise the option and sell the widgets to Z instead at the market price of, say, $5.50 per widget.
Here, X receives $5,500 from Z and still loses the $100 premium to Y. Regardless of how much the
market fluctuates, or what course of action X chooses, X can lose no more than $100 on the option
contract. But if the price of widgets on May I of next year has fallen so drastically that widget producer
Q offers to pay X $1,000 for the right to sell widgets to Y for $5 apiece, X makes a profit of $900 by
selling the option to Y, however, as the seller or "writer" of the option contract, X faces unlimited
exposure and thus must post and maintain margins as if the transaction were a futures contract.
12. Thomas Lee Hazen, Public Policy: Rational Investments, Speculation or Gambling?-
Derivatives Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86




or swap. A swap is a contractual duty to exchange one type of asset for
another according to terms which the parties stipulate upon entering into the
contract. 14  Interest rate swaps comprise the largest chunk of the swap
market.' 5 Interest rate swaps involve one party paying an amount of a
specified currency at a fixed interest rate and the other party paying an
amount of the same currency at a floating rate based on the same principal.
The floating rate often corresponds to the London interbank offered rate
(LIBOR).' 6
Interest rate swaps effectively allow parties with contrasting assets and
liabilities to insulate themselves against the risk of fluctuations in interest
rates. 17 Institutions with primarily short-term, variable rate liabilities and
long-term, fixed-rate assets will face heightened interest payments as interest
rates rise. One example of such an institution is a local bank or "thrift"
institution. Such entities possess short-term, variable rate liabilities which
consist of interest owed to depositors based on interest rates pegged to
market rates. If such a bank has lent a sizable portion of these deposits to
borrowers at fixed rates (e.g., for home mortgages), it will face an asset-
liability mismatch.' 8 In contrast, many finance companies issue loans at
floating rates and hence possess largely floating rate assets. If such an
organization took out fixed rate debt to finance its business, an opposite
mismatch results.'9 If interest rates tumble, institutions with fixed rate
liabilities and floating rate assets will suffer a decline in interest income.
Such an institution can match up with a counterpart with predominantly
fixed rate assets and floating rate liabilities in a swap transaction, thereby
shielding both from the risk of interest rate fluctuations.
When used as a hedging device, interest rate swaps serve the same basic
function as futures and options contracts-to reallocate risk. Yet swaps
circumvent the four major drawbacks inherent in contracts traded on futures
and options exchanges. Interest rate swaps may also be employed for two
additional purposes: to arbitrage differences in capital markets or to access
14. Giles, supra note 9, at 4.
15. Daniel P. Cunningham et al., Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions,
in SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1992, at 13 (William P. Rogers, Jr. ed., 1992).
16. Id. at 11; Giles, supra note 9, at 4. For a more technical analysis, see James Bicksler and
Andrew H. Chen, An Economic Analysis ofInterest Rate Swaps, 41 J. OF FIN. 633 (1986).
17. Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at 15.
18. See Henry T.C. Hu, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of
A Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 349 (1989).
19. Id.
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parties to capital resources which would be otherwise unavailable.2" If the
swap provides a party with access to capital it otherwise would not have
been able to obtain, it serves a function similar to that of a security. While
clothed a bit differently than the typical offering of debt or equity, the end
result is the same. The party can procure additional resources which it can
use to create new wealth. Regardless of its ultimate purpose, the swap
transaction itself is a zero-sum game, in that the net effect on both parties
of the fluctuations of the interest rates subject to the interest rate swap totals
zero." However, although the swap creates no new value, both parties can
benefit by entering into the transaction. Thus, swap transactions uniquely
resemble both commodities and securities.
Major investment and commercial banks provide liquidity by
maintaining large positions in the swap market.22 Typically, end-users of
swap transactions do not swap directly with each other.2 3 Instead, they
separately conduct swap transactions with the investment firm, which acts
as a dealer.24 By providing a ready counterparty to every swap transaction,
20. Id. For detailed explanations see Barry W. Taylor, Swaps: Dealing in Interest Rates, in
SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1992, supra note 15, at 121-33; Christopher Dean Olander and
Cynthia L. Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status Under Federal Tax and Securities Laws, 45 MD. L. REv.
21, 22-27 (1986). Taylor illustrates how interest rate swaps work as an arbitrage device. A is a public
company with a Tripe-A credit rating. Due to its credit standing, banks will loan A substantial sums at
a fixed rate, say 100/c. B is a middle market company or a smaller lending institution. Since it cannot
boast the credit rating of A, large lenders will be more wary of loaning B capital at a fixed rate. In order
to compensate for the risk that B will default on the fixed rate loan, such lenders will provide B with
a fixed-rate loan only at 12%. A and B enter into a swap transaction whereby:
-A raises fixed-rate capital at 10%; B raises floating rate capital at LIBOR plus 0.75%.
-In the swap transaction, B pays A 10.5% for the fixed-rate loan; A pays B LIBOR for the
floating rate debt. Assuming A originally could have procured the floating rate loan at
LIBOR, A earns a 0.5% net gain from the transaction (10.5%-10%). B claims a net benefit
of 0.75%. In the absence of the swap transaction, B could only procure fixed rate debt at
12%. As a result of the swap transaction, B's borrowing cost is only 11.25% (10.5% fixed
rate borrowing cost on the purchase from A plus a 0.75% loss on the sale of floating rate
assets to A). Note that even if A could not procure a fixed rate loan for the same capital at
any rate, if B was still willing to go through with the swap, A could gain access to the same
fixed-rate capital by entering into a similar swap with B.
Taylor, supra, at 124-25. For an explanation of the motivations behind some of the more complex swap
transactions employed in the 1990's, see Robert H. Litzenberger, Presidential Address: Swaps: Plain
and Fanciful, 47 J. OF FN. 831, 841-44 (1992).
21. See Barry W. Taylor, Running With the Pack: The Collective Behavior of Swap Dealers,
in INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY SWAPS 45, 56 (1988).
22. Taylor, supra note 20, at 124-25. For an indepth analysis of the risks facing the swap dealer,
see Hu, supra note 18, at 358.
23. Taylor, supra note 20, at 124-25.
24. Id. Approximately 130 large banks and investment banking firms currently serve as swap
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investment firms enable each customer to execute the swap transaction at the
time and in the manner which the customer (the end-user) prescribes.25 In
addition, investment firms not choosing to assume the risk of taking large
positions in the swap market may act as matchmakers for customers seeking
a mate in a swap transaction.26
While viewed as exotic, arcane, and esoteric financial instruments only
a few years ago,27 swaps have gained widespread acceptance in mainstream
financial circles. Multinational corporations and other institutions which
face interest rate, currency, or other risks28 have identified swap
transactions as the optimal medium for mitigating their existing risk.
Despite a dearth of information on the true nature of the risks these
transactions entail, large commercial and investment banks have flocked to
dealing in swap transactions. Such historically conservative institutions have
discovered that the sizable commissions they can earn by dealing in the
swap market outweigh the substantial, although largely unquantifiable risk
of maintaining a large portfolio of swap transactions and have plunged into
the swap market. The volume of interest rate swaps has ballooned at an
exponential rate since swaps first appeared in 1982.29 Notional amounts
outstanding on interest rate swap contracts have skyrocketed from $3 billion
in 1982 to $683 billion in 1987 to an estimated $3 trillion in 1991.30
Nothing signals an impending reversal or slowdown in this trend.3
Currency swaps are the pioneer form of swap transaction and remain
widely used today. Currency swaps entail one party paying periodic fixed
amounts of one currency and the other party paying periodic fixed amounts
of a different currency.32 Much like interest rate swaps, currency swaps
dealers. Jerry Knight, Gramm Moves to Keep "Swaps" Unregulated; Huge Financial Market Is at Stake;
Fed, Hill Wary, WASH. POST., Jan. 13, 1993, at Fl.
25. Taylor, supra note 20, at 124-25.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599, 1600 (1986).
28. Today's complex swap transactions permit parties to hedge against almost any imaginable
risk, provided a willing counterparty is available.
29. Charles Dropkin et al., Special Report, in THE REGULATIONS COVERING DERIVATIVES- AN
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE 36 (1992); see also Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at II.
30. See also Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at II.
31. See Dropkin et al., supra note 29, at 36.
32. Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at 13. Sources estimate the 1992 swap market at $4
trillion. CNN Moneyline (CNN Television Broadcast, Jan. 14, 1993) (transcript available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library); Swap Dealers Hail CFTC Exemption Rule, REUTER'S, Jan. 14, 1993 (available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library).
19941
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match parties with conflicting exchange rate risk, with the investment firm
acting as the dealer. The primary goal of currency swaps is to hedge against
exchange rate fluctuations, although today often they are gowned in complex
transactions intimately tailored to the customer's desires to hedge across a
series of risks. In 1990, the notional amount of outstanding currency swaps
totalled $1.155 trillion, or approximately one-half of the sum for interest rate
swaps for the same year. 3
Both interest rate and currency swaps address the built-in disadvantages
of hedging risk by trading futures or options on organized exchanges.
Investment firms fit swaps to address the individual demands of their
customers.34 Unlike futures and options contracts, exchange-fixed contract
sizes and delivery dates do not constrain the customer. The investment firm
and the customer will negotiate to arrive at a mutually agreeable quantity
and termination date of the swap transaction. Further, lack of liquidity in
distant future months imposes no barrier to the swap transaction. Of the
currency swaps outstanding on December 31, 1990, over eighty percent were
due to mature in more than one year, and over half would not mature for
another four years.35 Thus, for the bulk of swap participants, futures and
options markets are not the ideal outlets for mitigation of their risk.
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL BODIES
A. The CFTC
The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over all
commodity futures and options contracts "traded or executed on a contract
market or any other board of trade, exchange, or market. ' 36 Section
2(a)(1)(A) defines "commodity" as "all ... goods and articles ... and all
services, rights and interests in which contracts for future delivery are
presently or in the future dealt in."37  The CEA fashioned such a broad
33. Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at 12.
34. See CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 21,
1989) [hereinafter CFTC Statement].
35. Cunningham et al., supra note 15, at 14. For interest rate swaps, the numbers were similar,
but not as striking. Over three-fourths of those outstanding still would not mature within the year. Id.




definition of the term "commodity" in order to promote innovation of new
products, but to ensure that these products fell under the ambit of CFTC
regulation. 8 The CEA explicitly refrained from defining the terms "futures
contract" and "future delivery."39 However, in a policy statement issued
in 1989, the CFTC defined "futures contracts" as "contracts for the purchase
or sale of a commodity for delivery in the future at a price that is
established when the contract is initiated, with both parties to the transaction
obligated to fulfill the contract at a specified price."40 The policy
statement notes several distinguishing features of futures contracts. First, the
parties in a futures contract do not aim to transfer the underlying
commodity; rather they undertake the contract in order to assume or shift
price risk. Second, futures contracts traditionally possess characteristics
such as standardized units, margin requirements, clearing firms which
guarantee performance of the contracts, centralized market trading, and
quotation of prices to the public."
Section 4(a) of the CEA restricts the trading of futures contracts to
exchanges authorized by the CFTC,42 unless the contract "is made on or
subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange or market located outside
the United States," or if an exemption is otherwise available. 43  Each
futures contract must satisfy criteria enumerated in Section 5 before the
CFTC will permit the exchange to trade the contract.44 Congress mandates
the trading of futures contracts on organized exchanges in order to curb
excessive speculation and the resulting price of these commodities.45
Congress' concern stems from the possibility that without an exchange to
monitor daily trading volume, wealthy investors could comer the market in
a particular commodity and thus drastically impact its price, adversely
38. Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation:
Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1431, 1448 (1991).
39. JOHNSON AND HAZEN, supra note 4, § 1.03.
40. CFTC Statement, supra note 34.
41. Id.
42. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988) (amended by the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-546, Sec. 502, 106 Stat. 3590 (Oct. 28, 1992)); see infra, part I1I.A. for a detailed analysis of the
FTPA amendments.
43. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
44. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
45. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1988) (documenting legislative findings on the public interest served by trading
futures on organized markets).
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affecting both consumers of the commodity and the integrity of the
marketplace.
Section 2(a)(1)(A) exempts from the CEA "transactions in foreign
currency, security warrants, security rights ...unless such transactions
involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of
trade."'46 This exemption, adopted in 1974, is known as the Treasury
Amendment. The Department of the Treasury lobbied for such a provision,
arguing that absent the exemption, the CEA would impede the ability of
financial institutions to trade foreign currency and other financial
instruments among themselves. 47 The CFTC noted that since other bodies
regulate these institutional investors, CFTC governance would be duplicative
and beyond the scope of the CEA.48 The language of the CEA, coupled
with the legislative history of the Treasury Amendment, suggests that all
transactions transpiring beyond the boundaries of exchange trading floors lie
outside CFTC jurisdiction.49 Presently, no court has ruled on the question
of whether swap transactions qualify as commodities. Thus, that decision
has rested squarely in the hands of the CFTC.
B. The SEC
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) governs all securities
except those expressly exempted by the language of the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act) or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act and Section 3(10) of the 1934 Act define a
security as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
47. Gilberg, supra note 27, at 1608; see also Trading in Foreign Currencies for Future Delivery,
50 C.F.R. §§ 42,983 and 42,985 (1985).
48. Russo and Vinciguerra, supra note 38, at 1448.
49. Gilberg, supra note 27, at 1609; cf Mark D. Young and William L. Stein, Swap
Transactions Under the Commodity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action Needed?, 76 GEO. L.J. 1917,
1925 (1988) (noting that the CFTC previously interpreted the Treasury Amendment to preserve CFTC
jurisdiction whenever the enumerated financial instruments were offered to the public).
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voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest of
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to purchase any of the
foregoing."
The question of what constitutes a security has baffled scholars and
courts alike for over half a century. In 1946, the Supreme Court fashioned
the benchmark test in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co." In Howey, the owner of
a citrus grove offered half of its acreage to the public to finance further
growth of its company. The owner coupled its offer of the land sales
contract with an option to enter into a service contract which conferred full
management rights to the property to the owner. Since most offerees were
investors not schooled in the nuances of citrus growing, eighty-five percent
of those investing bought into both contracts.5 2 In determining whether the
offering qualified as a security, the court focused on four factors. First, a
person must invest money in a contract, transaction, or scheme. 3 Second,
the instrument must be part of a common enterprise. 4 Third, there must
be an expectation of profits from the instrument." Fourth, the expectation
of profits must be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party. 6 In finding that the transaction qualified as an investment contract
50. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(10) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78(c) (1988)).
51. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
52. Id. at 295-96.
53. Id.
54. Id. The Ninth Circuit later defined "common enterprise" as "one in which the fortunes of
investors are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment
or of third parties." SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974) (providing an early application of the 9th Circuit's test).
55. Howey, 328 U.S. at299.
56. Id. at 300.
1994]
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and therefore a security, the Court noted that individual development of the
plots of land was infeasible." Investors could not have purchased the plots
for the purpose of cultivating them themselves, making the offering more
than simply a sale of land. Rather, the offering essentially amounted to an
investment opportunity whose success hinged on the managerial efforts of
the grove owners.
Subsequent courts have found the Howey analysis relevant only to
deciding whether an investment contract, which encompasses all instruments
not specifically covered by Section 2(1), constitutes a security. In Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, the Court held that so long as a stock possesses all
the characteristics traditionally associated with the term, it automatically
qualifies as a security." However, in Reves v. Ernst & Young,59 the
Court retrenched to a Howey-like analysis in considering whether a note fell
under the umbrella of Section 2(1). The Court began by presuming that all
notes are securities? ° Next, the Court compared the note in question to a
list which the Second Circuit had concluded were not securities.6'
Instruments bearing a close "family resemblance" to a listed note are not
grouped per se as a security.
For notes which resemble nothing on the list, the Court moved to a four
factor test. First, it considered the motivation of the buyer and seller in
entering into the transaction. If the goal of the transaction is investment of
money, rather than facilitation of a loan, a security exists. 62 This prong
57. Id.
58. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 682 (1985).
59. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990). For an excellent analysis of the state of
the law on whether a note constitutes a security, see Stephen J. Greenberg and Noel M. Gruber, The
Impact on Commercial Banking of Recent Developments in the Federal Securities Laws, ALl BANKING
AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW, Vol. XIII at 41 (1992).
60. See Reves, 494 U.S. at56.
61. Id. This list includes "the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a
mortgage on a home, the short term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, the
note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank customer, short term notes secured by an assignment of
accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an 'open account debt' incurred in the ordinary
course of business." Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138
(2d Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit did not extend the presumption that all notes are securities to notes
maturing within a nine month period. Such notes are exempted from registration by Section 3(a)(3) of
the 1933 Act, but are not immune from the antifraud provisions of the 1933 or 1934 Acts. See also
Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) (adding to the list notes
evidencing bank loans made for "current operations"); Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040, 1049
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (adding notes secured by home mortgages issued through a lawyer in a commercial
lending transaction).
62. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 (1990).
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mimics the first element of the Howey test, namely, investment of money in
a transaction or scheme. Second, the Reves Court examined the "'plan of
distribution' of the instrument, '63  which is akin to the "common
enterprise" analysis of the Howey test. Third, the Court looked at whether
the investing public reasonably expected the instrument to be classified as
a security. Finally, the Court considered whether the existence of another
form of regulation adequately protected investors, thereby rendering
application of the 1933 Act unnecessary.'
No court has decided whether a swap transaction constitutes a security.
However, in Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) v. SEC,65 the Seventh
Circuit narrowed the jurisdiction of the SEC over instruments which possess
elements of both commodities and securities. The court found that an index
participation, which contained some but not all features of stock and some
but not all characteristics of a futures contract, fell solely under the domain
of the CFTC. Employing somewhat dubious reasoning, the court decided
that although the instrument did not fit squarely either as a security or as a
futures contract, deference to the agencies' interpretation of their own
statutes permits classification of the instrument as both a commodity and a
security.66 In other words, so long as an instrument possesses at least one
element of a commodity, the court will permit the CFTC to classify the
instrument as a commodity for the purposes of regulation. Similarly, so
long as an instrument possesses at least one element of a security, the court
will not overturn an SEC pronouncement that the instrument is a security.
This reasoning clashes with the body of case law on what constitutes a
security. Courts consistently find that instruments, though possessing some
characteristics of securities, do not qualify as such despite the contentions
of the SEC to the contrary. Rather, courts hold that instruments must have
a close nexus to another instrument already considered to be a security 67
or to an instrument named in Sections 2(1) and 3(10).
The effect of CME v. SEC is to give the regulatory bodies ultimate say
over how to regulate new financial instruments. But at the same time, the
decision deals the CFTC the crucial upper hand. CME v. SEC interprets the
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that a government
insured certificate of deposit was not a security since federal banking laws protect such investments).
65. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 547, 549.
67. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681.
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exclusivity clause of Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA to arm the CFTC with
sole jurisdiction over an instrument which is classified as both a commodity
and a security.6" But Section 2(a)(1)(A) also claims not to limit any other
regulatory body from properly asserting its jurisdiction over an
instrument.69  Under the latter clause of Section 2(a)(1)(A), it could be
argued that despite the exclusivity clause, the CEA permits the SEC to
regulate instruments which fit both as a commodity and a security.
CME v. SEC provides the CFTC with the first crack at regulating all
new instruments with aspects of both futures contracts and securities.70 If
the CFTC passes on its regulatory authority, it is unclear whether the SEC
may then act. While the effect of CME v. SEC seemingly is to bar the SEC
from asserting any jurisdiction over instruments which may not qualify
precisely as futures contracts but possess some elements of both futures
contracts and securities, the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit has come under
attack,7' and may not be upheld if the SEC tests the waters by attempting
to assert jurisdiction over swap transactions.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF REGULATION
A. The CFTC Abdicates the Throne
CME v. SEC potentially could wield a profound impact on the regulation
of swap transactions. Swaps possess characteristics of both commodities
and securities. In broad terms, a swap i's a contract involving a stream of
payments to be made in the future, and as such resembles a futures
contract.72 Let us consider swap transactions in light of the CFTC
definition of futures contracts. First, in an interest rate swap, the parties do
not transfer the underlying commodity, in this case the principal of the loan.
In fact, neither party makes any principal payments during the life of the
transaction.73  The payments made constitute amounts fixed by the
transaction based on a mathematical formula. No exchanges of interest or
68. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 883 F.2d 537.
69. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
70. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 883 F.2d 537; see Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 38, at
1437.
71. See, e.g., Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 38.




principal occur. In a currency swap, however, both interest and principal are
transferred. 74 The transaction seeks to exchange the commodities, namely
the currencies transacted, for each other. In a sense, however, this is a
misnomer. The effect of a currency swap parallels that of a forward
contract or futures contract in foreign currency, to transfer price risk of the
currency. Second, when employed as a hedging device, both interest rate
and currency swaps undertake to shift price risk. Since the chief aim of the
CFTC is to regulate hedging activities," swaps fall securely within this
realm. Third, swaps contain none of the distinctive qualities of a futures
contract. Standardized units, margin requirements, centralized trading and
public price quotations are absent in current swap transactions. Swaps
conducted through dealers resemble clearinghouse transactions to the extent
that by the terms of the particular contract, the dealer guarantees
performance of the swap. Thus, unlike futures contracts, swap customers
need not fulfill statutory margin requirements and no regulatory regime
insures the transactions themselves. Although swap transactions fail to
measure up to most of the elements of a futures contract, the Congressional
declaration of the CFTC as the guardian of transactions which serve as a
hedging device, coupled with the CFTC paradigm of wide agency discretion,
provides enough of an aperture to qualify the instruments as futures
contracts.76 As mentioned, under current law, classification as a futures
contract arms the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over the instrument
under Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA.
Congress moved to provide legal certainty as to the proper regulatory
treatment of swaps by passing the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992
(FTPA).77 Section 502 of the FTPA amends Section 4 of the CEA to
permit the CFTC to exempt any agreement, contract, or transaction which
74. Id. at 353.
75. When Congress created the CFTC in 1974, it intended for the CFTC to "regulate markets
and instruments that serve a hedging and price discovery function and [for] the SEC [to] regulate markets
and instruments with an underlying investment purpose." S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1982). "One could think of the difference between the jurisdiction of the SEC and the CFTC as the
difference between capital formation and hedging. Congress conceived of the role of the CFTC when
it created the agency." Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 543 (1989).
76. See S. REP. No. 384, supra note 75.
77. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1992). For a summary of the FTPA exemptions and a comparison with past
CFTC regulation of swaps, see David S. Mitchell and Mark W. Saks, CFTC Exemptions for Swap
Agreements and Hybrid Instruments, in 9 Rav. OF BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 87 (Standard & Poor's,
May 5, 1993).
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otherwise qualifies as a futures contract from the requirement that such an
instrument be traded on an organized futures exchange. More importantly,
the Amendment grants the CFTC the power to declare such an instrument
immune from any other provision of the CEA, with the key exception of
Section 2(a)(1)(B), which confers exclusive jurisdiction of all futures
contracts upon the CFTC.7 8
In order to exempt such a transaction, the CFTC must make three
findings. First, the Commission must decide that the public interest supports
such an exemption.79 Second, the CFTC must find that the transaction will
not impede the Commission and exchanges under its jurisdiction from
performing their regulatory duties under the CEA. ° Third, the CFTC must
be satisfied that the transaction involves solely "appropriate persons" as
parties."
The FTPA defines appropriate persons to encompass parties reasonably
likely to guarantee the obligations of the transaction-in other words, parties
who seemingly do not require an independent clearinghouse to insure the
transaction." One such group consists of financial institutions, including
banks or trust companies, savings associations, insurance companies, and
investment companies coming under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Presumably, such institutions possess the capital reserves to guarantee the
transaction and are regulated by other regimes. Another group contains
commodity pools, futures commission merchants (FCM's), floor brokers and
floor traders subject to CFTC regulation under the CEA, and broker-dealers
subject to SEC regulation under the 1934 Act. Since these parties already
fall under the umbrella of the CFTC or the SEC, presumably these agencies
will discover spurious transactions before they occur. For the most part, the
members of the latter group do not have the resources to conduct a swap
and are not in the business of attempting to do so.
The third group of "appropriate persons" is composed of corporations
or other business entities with a net worth in excess of $1 million, total




82. The legislative history of the FTPA indicates that appropriate persons have been so
designated because the CFTC determined that such entities "have the financial and other qualifications




assets over $5 million, or which by terms of the agreement guarantee the
obligations of the transaction, and employee benefit plans with assets of
more than $1 million or whose investment decisions are made by a party
represented in one of the first two groups. Again, the Act aimed to ensure
that participants in unregulated transactions possess the reserves to guarantee
the obligations of the contract. However, with regard to swap transactions,
the restrictions on this cluster are meaningless. The magnitude of most
swaps presently conducted dictates that only parties with capital well in
excess of the minimums will dare to delve into such dealings. Further, the
exposure of swappers who default on their payments dwarfs the minimum
capital requirements which the Act imposes and thus serves as a flimsy
barrier to parties who overextend themselves in swap transactions. Such
overexposure is not unlikely, since corporate decision-makers understand the
risk of swaps to an even lesser degree than their counterparts in the banking
industry, 3 and unwarily could authorize a swap which far outstrips the
company's financial ability to fulfill its obligations under adverse market
contingencies. Ill-conceived swaps could result in overexposure so
catastrophic as to bankrupt the company and force it to incur obligations it
can never repay. Finally, the amendment authorizes the CFTC to designate
other persons who may conduct swap transactions under the exemption. To
this end, the CFTC has adopted Rule 35.1(b)(2)(xi), which allows persons
(including individuals) to conduct unregulated swaps provided their net
worth exceeds $5 million or their total assets surpass $10 million."
The CFTC imposed three additional criteria which parties to swap
transactions seeking immunity from the CEA must satisfy. First, swaps may
not be part of a "fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to
their material economic terms." 5  This requirement aims to prevent the
exemption from covering standardized swap contracts.8 6 If a market for
boilerplate swaps develops, the CFTC wishes to retain jurisdiction under the
CEA.
83. See Patrick Haverson, Survey of Derivatives, FiN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, at II.
84. CFTC Proposed Rules: Exemption for Certain Swap Arrangements, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,627
(1992) [hereinafter CFTC Rules]; 17 C.F.R. § 35.1(b)(2)(xi) (1992); A. Robert Pietrzak & Michael S.
Sackheim, CFTC Exemption Procedures for Novel Derivative Transactions, in 26 REV. OF SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 121 (Standard & Poor's, 1993) (codifying the adopted rule).
85. Pietrzak & Sackheim, supra note 84, at 123.
86. Id.
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Second, the creditworthiness of parties obligated to the swap must
receive "material consideration"87 in defining the terms of the agreement.
The CFTC aims to exclude transactions subject to a clearing mechanism,
which shifts the credit risk away from the obligated parties and instead
installs a system of mutualized risk of loss which binds members regardless
of whether they are parties to the original transaction.88 The rule seeks to
ensure that exempted swaps remain distinct from futures contracts in that no
clearinghouse guarantees the obligations of swap participants. Ease of
administration may play a central role behind this requirement. The CFTC
can be forced to regulate any clearinghouse for swap transactions, or at least
enumerate specific conditions for its exemptions. By prohibiting swap
transaction clearinghouses, the CFTC relieves itself of this burden. The
Commission believes that the capital requirements for exempt swap
participants provided in the FTPA suffice to enable the parties to clear their
own transactions, and that such parties possess the financial resources or
expertise to evaluate the credit risk of their counterparts. As such, a
guaranteed clearinghouse confers only marginal benefits.89
Here, it is important to reiterate that absent a contractual provision to the
contrary, a customer whose swap partner defaults on the transaction holds
no warranty for performance. Most customers swap with large lending
institutions which by federal law must boast sizable capital reserves. These
reserves are calculated in a manner designed to ensure that they are
sufficient to back every swap transaction the institution undertakes.' The
wave of bank failures during the past decade highlighted one danger of
87. Id. at 124.
88. CFTC Rules, supra note 84.
89. Id. In August 1993, CFTC officials convened with industry leaders and discussed the
possibility of developing a central clearing facility for swap transactions. CFTC Swaps Clearinghouse
Discussion Sparks Debate Among Exchanges, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1136 (Aug. 13, 1993).
Proponents maintain that a swaps clearinghouse would decrease the costs of conducting swaps while
managing risk. Further, a clearinghouse would prevent less credit worthy parties from being shut out
of the swap market. Id. The idea is that in the absence of a clearing facility, parties with high credit
ratings typically would not wish to conduct swaps with parties having a lesser credit rating, since the
latter have a higher probability of default. Private incentives dictate, however, that parties with differing
credit ratings could still match on a swap transaction without a central clearing facility. The party with
a higher rating could command a premium for entering into the transaction with a less credit worthy
party since the former accepts a greater level of default risk. Opponents argue that the customized nature
of swaps, the inability of a clearinghouse to predict volatility in order to measure risk, and "phenomenal"
start-up costs constitute formidable impediments to the formation of a swap clearinghouse. Id.
90. See discussion infra part III.C.
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leaving the swap market unregulated." However, since the capital
requirements of banks are regulated,92 the risk of default on swap
transactions only exceeds the risk of default on a traditional extension of
credit (e.g., a consumer loan) if each of two conditions are met. First, banks
must misinterpret the risks of the swap. When extending traditional credit,
the bank charges a premium based on its evaluation of the risk of the
customer defaulting on the loan. The bank, seeking to maximize its return,
will extend credit (to the extent that such business is available) to the
equilibrium point where its default risk meets its legally imposed minimum
capital requirement. Stressing the increasing complexity of today's swaps,
many contend that nobody, least of all the bankers, can quantify the risks
inherent in swaps.93 If bankers underestimate the risks of their swaps, the
probability of customer default exceeds the default premium. Thus, the
default risk calculus will be skewed, and the bank will attempt to assume
more risk from swap transactions than the true optimal level. In reality,
9 1. Fears of bank failure may not be completely unfounded, even in the current climate of high
profitability in the banking industry. Derivative activity does not appear on a bank's balance sheet,
which can render its financial statements misleading. An efficient market discounts from the financials
when valuing the bank's stock to account for the risk of an adverse shock to the bank's swap portfolio.
A severe enough shock could threaten the viability of the bank. Banc One Chairman John B. McCoy
claims that the extensive use of interest rate swaps contributed to a decline in Banc One's share price.
Steve Klinkerman, Banc One's McCoy Tries to Calm Fears Over Heavy Use of Derivatives, AM.
BANKR, Oct. 22, 1993, at 4. Banc One maintains $31 billion of off-balance sheet interest rate swaps,
compared with $75 billion in other assets, a ratio which likely is not atypical of major commercial banks.
Id. While a default on all of its swaps would not jeopardize its viability on the books, clearly it would
place Bane One in a serious financial pinch.
Notably, however, the use of swaps has added to the bank's profitability. Some industry leaders
have lauded Banc One for its prudent risk management strategy and feel that the correction in share price
due to derivative activity is temporary. Steven Lipin, Banc One Draws Interest of Investors, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 10, 1993, at CI.
92. E.g., FDICIA § 131, 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (Supp. I1 1991); Proposed [Federal Reserve Board]
Rule to Incorporate Credit Risks on Interest Rate Swaps Into Proposed Risk-Based Capital Measure, 52
Fed. Reg. 9304 (Mar. 24, 1987); see generally 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1993).
93. For an explanation of why banks invariably misinterpret the risks of their swaps, see Henry
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1467-70 (1993). Hu does maintain that bankers at least
edge regulators in the race to comprehend derivative product risk. Id. at 1463.
Conversely, Joseph P. Bauman, Chairman of the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA)
and head of derivatives at Citibank, claims that current risk management facilities adequately account
for the risk of swaps. Bauman stresses that swap risk differs little from other risks which financial
institutions undertake in the ordinary course of their business. Further, both the innovators of the
instruments and regulators sufficiently understand the risk to uphold the current regulatory paradigm
safely. Claudia Cummins, Q and A: Swaps Industry Is Self-Regulating, Chairman Says, Am. BANKER,
Oct. 28, 1993, at 3.
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banks have economic incentives to overweigh, rather than underweigh, the
extent of their risk. Banks recognize that the true risk level of swaps is
unquantifiable. Fearing the potentially disastrous consequences of
overexposure on their financial viability, banks will err on the side of
underweighing the true risk levels.' Thus, if banks act rationally, the
danger of default on swap transactions may not be cause for alarm, even if
managers misinterpret the risk of swap transactions. Second, the legally
imposed minimum capital requirements must misconstrue the risk factors.
If the minimum requirements properly evaluate the risk, even if the bank
attempts to overextend itself, the requirements will act as a check and will
prohibit the bank from engaging in more swaps than the true optimal level.
But, as the discussion in Part III.C. of this note indicates, the requirements
fail to consider all relevant risk factors and, as a result, will yield skewed
capital requirements. The solution to this problem is not added regulation,
but correction of the minimum capital requirement formulae to reflect the
true risk factors.
The third CFTC criterion for CEA immunity is that the swap-traders
must not trade on or through an organized market.9" Since a central
characteristic of a futures contract is that it must trade on a CFTC-
authorized exchange, in the absence of the exemption, under CME v. CFTC,
the CFTC would likely be empowered with regulating any central market for
swaps. Such markets would be required to fulfill the conditions of section
5 of the CEA. While presently no centralized swap market exists,96
exchanges worldwide have been mixing ingredients in attempts to conjure
the ideal potion for the prize swap contract that will capture the huge
transaction fees for arranging swaps from private investment firmS. 97
94. The response is that if banks operate completely in the dark with regard to swap risks, they
never can be sure that they are underweighting true risk levels, no matter how few swaps they conduct.
95. Pietrzak & Sackeim, supra note 84, at 124. section 35.2(d) mandates that a swap must not
trade through a "multilateral execution facility," which essentially entails an organized market, such as
a futures exchange. The CFTC defines "multilateral execution facility" as "a physical or electronic
facility in which all market makers and other participants have the ability to effectuate transactions and
bind both parties by accepting offers which are made by one member and open to all members of the
facility." CFTC Rules, supra note 84. The prohibition does not prevent counterparties from utilizing
information transmittal or other electronic facilities so long as the parties privately negotiate a bilateral
transaction and do not use the system to place orders to execute the transaction. 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(d)
(1992).
96. At least to the knowledge of the CFTC, no such market exists.
97. The CBT first attempted to trade two interest rate swap futures contracts in 1991. The effort
failed largely because the ISDA rebuffed the contracts. Currently, the CBT plans to establish a trading
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Exchange-traded contracts can offer liquidity, public price disclosure, and
clearinghouse guarantees. However, unless an exchange could craft a
contract which retains customization, most likely few major swap players
would be interested.98 The effect of the CFTC rules is to exempt all
interest rate swap transactions conducted on the over-the-counter market.
However, the CFTC retains regulatory power over swaps traded at
exchanges such as the CBT and CME. The final CFTC rules leave open
the possibility that the CFTC can enforce its antifraud provisions with regard
to swaps."°° In its comments to the final rules, the CFTC noted that "[t]o
the extent that swap agreements may be deemed subject to the [Commodity
Exchange] Act, the Commission has determined specifically to reserve in
these rules the antifraud authority applicable to futures contracts and options
transactions."' 00
B. The SEC: The Legal Heir?
The SEC has yet to decide formally whether it should add swap
transactions to its potpourri of regulated instruments. 0 2  In order to fall
under the SEC's reign, swaps must qualify as securities under the definition
system called HITS (Hybrid Instruments Transactions System) which will facilitate the purchase and sale
of interest rate swaps and an array of other novel instruments on a computerized trading market. William
B. Crawford, Jr., Board of Trade Maps New Foray Over the Counter, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1993, § 3, at
I. For a discussion of computerized futures trading at major exchanges, see Michael B. Sundel & Lystra
G. Blake, Good Concept, Bad Executions: The Regulation and Self-Regulation of Automated Trading
Systems in United States Futures Markets, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 748 (1991).
98. See Caren Chester, Executive Update, INVESTOR'S DAILY, Dec. 31, 1992, at 3 (noting that
although exchange-traded swaps are in the works, inability to customize may doom such contracts). But
see Morse, supra note 8, at IV (quoting Chicago Board Options Exchange Vice-Chairman William
Floersch who noted that organized exchanges plan to court the "small and medium sized dealers into the
derivatives business"). Presumably, the exchanges believe that the burgeoning demand for swap products
is sufficient to support futures contracts for the instruments, and that the smaller players will supply a
sufficient niche for exchange contracts.
99. William B. Crawford, Jr., CFTC Says Swaps Market Is Out of Its Jurisdiction, CHI. TRIB,
Jan. 15, 1993, § 3, at 3; Sandra Block, CFTC to Exempt Most Swaps From Its Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan.
15, 1993, at A5.
100. 'Swaps'Market Won't Face Regulation, But Rules Against Fraud, Manipulation Will Apply,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 15, 1993, at G5.
101. CFTC Adopts Final Rules Exempting Swaps and Hybrids, 60 BANKING REP. (BNA) 93 (Jan.
25, 1993), available in Westlaw, BNA-BNK Database.
102. The SEC indicated that it would assert jurisdiction in the event that a broker-dealer defrauded
an unsophisticated investor in a swap transaction. House Hearing, supra note 1. "[The SEC] will not
hesitiate to enforce the antifraud provisions of the [1933 and 1934 Acts]... to ensure that broker-dealers
refrain from recommending unsuitable [derivative] products to uninformed investors." Id.
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in sections 2(1) and 3(10) and its progeny of case law. Under the Reves
analysis,10 3 even if a swap transaction properly can be classified as a note,
most likely it will fail to rank among the notes which constitute
securities. 1" Swaps resemble notes in two primary ways. First, both
involve a stream of payments to be made over a period of time. Second,
financial institutions play central roles in both types of transactions. Large
banking institutions in the ordinary course of their business act as dealers to
the swap transaction, while lending institutions are in the business of issuing
notes for various loans. Unlike the notes classified as investment vehicles,
and therefore securities under the Reves analysis, swaps do not purport to
be notes and have many features which distinguish them from the prototype
note. Most significantly, unlike a note, which typically involves a lump sum
payment by the lender and a series of repayments by the borrower, a swap
entails a "trade" of note-like obligations which require both parties to make
a stream of payments throughout the life of the swap. Further, unlike
traditional notes, swaps entail no exchange of principal.
Applying the Reves test, swaps clearly bear no "family resemblance" to
any note on the Second Circuit's list of notes which are not securities.
Defaulting to the four part test, 0 5 first, hedging against price risk or
gaining access to otherwise unavailable sources of capital motivate the
entrant into the swap. Such a goal fails to evince investment intent if the
term "investment" is defined as allocation of money with the expectation of
obtaining an income or profit. " When used as a hedging device, the
swap offers no rate of return, income, or profit; it functions merely as a
shield to price fluctuations. When employed to access unavailable capital,
the swap serves to facilitate a loan, a function which the Reves court
specifically cited as signaling an absence of investment intent. 7 Second,
swaps typically constitute specific bargains between the two parties and as
such, no "plan of distribution" or "common enterprise" exists. The dealer
103. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
104. A swap does not clearly resemble any other instrument named in Section 2(1) and 3(10).
If a swap was not considered a note, and thus resembled no stated instrument, the analysis would proceed
to determining whether a swap qualified as an investment contract under the Howey test. Under this
analysis, the swap would fail the first two elements of the test. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying
text. Third, no expectation of profits exist; the parties expect merely to hedge risk or access new capital.
Since no profits accrue, the fourth factor is inapplicable and need not be considered.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
106. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3rd Unabridged Edition 1981).
107. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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offers the particular swap only to an individual customer, not to any group
of entities, and the customer and the dealer are the sole parties to the
agreement. Third, the sophistication of all parties entering into swap
transactions creates the presumption that such parties know that the SEC
does not regulate the instruments as securities. Since swaps do not involve
any offerings to persons not party to the transaction, whether or not the
general investor perceives swaps as securities is irrelevant. Finally, the
CFTC possesses primary jurisdiction over swap transactions given that they
are classified properly as futures contracts. Any jurisdiction the SEC
chooses to assert would be subject to CFTC challenge under the exclusivity
clause of the CEA. Besides creating additional friction between the two
agencies, the plain language of the CEA and the interpretation of the
Seventh Circuit in CME v. SEC indicate that the CFTC solely controls
instruments which are both commodities and securities.'0 8
C. Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Famine or Buffet?
1. A Dish of International Self-Regulation: The BIS Accord
Banking institutions worldwide face billions of dollars of exposure to
loss from derivative products, with ninety percent of this risk accrued in
seven institutions."°9 When compared to the size of the $3.5 trillion
banking system,"0 the concentration of risk in many of the world's largest
institutions could be cause for alarm. Since the major risk of institutions
entering into swap transactions is what Federal Reserve Vice-Chairman
David Mullins, Jr. terms "old-fashioned credit exposure,""' the failure of
any one of these institutions could have a domino effect on the entire
industry, which in turn would cause an odor of doom to waft throughout the
global financial community."2 The impact on the global economy would
be drastic-equivalent to the detonation of an economic time bomb. As a
preemptive strike against such a catastrophe, financial leaders from the
108. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
109. David Mullins, Jr., Vice-Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Address at the JFK School of
Government, Harvard University (C-SPAN television broadcast, Dec. 17, 1992).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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major global financial powerhouses convened to develop a risk control
mechanism for these institutions.
In 1988, the Bastle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) established a
complex set of rules designed to set a consistent international standard for
capital supply for all international banks.1 3 The Federal Reserve adopted
the BIS rules for minimum capital requirements in 1989, and today these
rules govern all domestic banks." 4 These rules require banks to maintain
capital reserves sufficient to guarantee performance on their swap
transactions.' Banks must meet specified capital adequacy ratios, which
measure the bank's ratio of capital to its aggregate credit risk. Intricate
formulae determine the amount of credit risk an institution undertakes. Each
swap transaction the bank enters is funneled into the formula. 16 The
formula yields an adjusted figure representing the total assets of the bank to
account for overall risk exposure of the institution occasioned by its swap
transactions.' Under rules which took effect at the end of 1992, banks
must support the capital equivalent of eight percent of their risk-adjusted
assets."
8
If the calculations under the BIS formulae could produce perfectly
accurate figures, the BIS Accord would effectively address the problem of
default. If banks could in fact back the performance of all swap
transactions, thus performing the role of a clearinghouse, the swap consumer
would be protected in much the same manner as the futures contract
customer who retains the benefit of CFTC protection. However, one major
flaw infests the BIS Accord. The BIS engineers developed the formulae for
calculation of risk factors to evaluate the traditional swap contracts popular
at the time." 9 The past several years have witnessed a spiraling in the
113. BIS Committe Amends Capital Rules to Further Define Loan Loss Reserves, 56 BANKING
REP. (BNA) 369 (Feb. 21, 1991) [hereinafter BISAmendment]. For an in-depth discussion of the history
of the BIS commitee and an analysis of its 1988 accord, see Hu, supra note 18, at parts 11-III. See also
Camille M. Caesar, Capital-Based Regulation and US. Banking Reform, 101 YALE L.J. 1525 (1992);
Duncan E. Alford, Bastle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and
Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 189 (1992).
114. Caesar, supra note 113, at 1526; 12 C.F.R. § 208.1-127 & app. A-B (1991); 12 C.F.R. §
160-88 & app. A-B, 208 1-127 & app. A-B (1991).
115. Hu, supra note 18, at 371.
116. Id. at 386.
117. Id. at 392.
118. BIS Amendment, supra note 113, at 369.
119. Hu, supra note 18, at 413.
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complexity of swap transactions. Since the accuracy of the numbers
diminishes as the swap becomes more complex, applying the formulae to
today's swaps results in capital requirements which bear little if any relation
to the true risk factors.120 Further, the BIS formulae primarily measure
credit risk, and effectively ignore interest rate risk.'2' Credit risk is the
risk of a counterparty to a swap transaction defaulting on its payments.'
Interest rate risk is the risk that fluctuations in interest rates will hurt the
financial condition of the bank.' Such risk occurs when dealers possess
an unbalanced portfolio of swap transactions. A dealer who has sold
significantly more swaps to customers with variable rate liabilities and fixed
rate assets than to customers with the opposite asset-liability mix encounters
interest rate risk. Since interest rate risk is not factored into the BIS
formulae, banks have no formal incentive to mitigate interest rate risk.
Given the likely possibility that the bank has an unbalanced swap
portfolio,'24 the formulae will yield skewed capital requirements.
Due to the inevitable inaccuracy of its capital requirements, the BIS
Accord offers little guarantee of the liquidity of swap dealers. Further, even
if the agreement did eradicate all risk of default, and did consider interest
rate risk, its existence would not obviate the need for further regulation.
The BIS Accord regulates only the banking institutions which conduct swap
transactions. It does not regulate the swap transactions themselves, nor does
it contain any provisions to guard against fraud.
2. The FDICIA Grabs a Plate
To supplement one void left by the BIS Accord, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act added measures to address interest
120. Id. at 415. For a more general critique of the BIS Accord, see Kenneth J. Gordon, Risk-
Based Capital Requirements: The Proper Approach to Safe and Sound Banking? 10 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 491 (1991).
121. See Prop. Treas. Reg., 57 Fed. Reg. 35,507 (1992) (Risk-Based Capital Standards).
122. Haverson, supra note 83, at 11.
123. Fed Adopts Notice on Interest-Rate Risk, Proposes Prompt Corrective Rules, 58 BANKING
REP. (BNA) 1120, 1120 (June 29, 1992) [hereinafter Fed Notice].
124. See Klinkerman, supra note 91 at 4. "Banc One is typical of most banks ... in that it has
a heavy concentration of variable-rate loans and fixed-rate deposits that leaves it in a position where
assets perenially are repricing more quickly than liabilities. This is precarious in an environment of
falling rates." Id.
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rate risk in computing capital maintenance standards. 2 Section 305 of
the FDICIAU '26 mandates federal banking agencies to revise their risk-based
capital standards to ensure appropriate consideration of the risk of
nontraditional banking activities such as interest rate swaps.'27 Institutions
judged to possess excessive levels of interest rate risk would be forced to
hold additional capital in an amount proportionate to the added risk.2
The FDICIA developed a sophisticated model to evaluate interest rate risk.
The paradigm incorporates into its calculations complex financial
instruments such as the swap transactions that currently prevail.'29 While
the FDICIA addresses one failure of the BIS Accord, namely accounting for
interest rate risk in its caluculations, it fails to remedy the defects in the
existing system of determining credit risk. The Federal Reserve has not yet
crafted revised risk-based formulae to account for credit risk which
adequately consider the complexity of current swap transactions, although
it is currently taking comments on how best to revise the existing
standards. 30
The Treasury Department announced three principal objectives in
adopting capital requirements which account for interest rate risk. The first
objective is "to make capital requirements sensitive to differences in interest
rate exposures among savings associations. . . . ""' The second goal is
to "discourage savings associations from taking excessive interest rate risk
by making such behavior more costly . ",32 The third aim is to
"ensure that adequate capital is maintained in savings associations to reduce
the exposure of the deposit insurance fund and to protect the taxpayers'
interests."'3 As the objectives of the FDICIA indicate, the Act is solely
concerned with protecting depository institutions. Regulation of swap
transactions themselves, and protection of the customer who engages in
125. Prop. Treas. Reg., 57 Fed. Reg. 35, 507 (1992) (Risk-Based Capital Standards).
126. FDICIA § 305, 12 U.S.C. §1828 (Supp. Il 1991).
127. For a detailed analysis of the formulae which calculate interest rate risk, see Prop. Treas.
Reg., 57 Fed. Reg. 40,524 (1992) (Regulatory Capital: Interest Rate Risk Component) [hereinafter
Treasury Rules]; Prop. Treas. Reg. 48,206 (1993) (Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk) (for
a revision of the 1992 standard).
128. Fed Notice, supra note 123.
129. Treasury Rules, supra note 127, at 40,525.
130. Fed Notice, supra note 123. Existing standards for assessing credit risk are based on the BIS
Accord guidelines. See Hu, supra note 18, at 366.
13 I. Fed Notice, supra note 123.
132. See id.
133. See supra note 95.
[Vol. 1: 515
SWAPS AHOY!
swaps, is outside the scope of the bodies who regulate the banking industry.
Further, lawmakers question whether the FDICIA formulae accurately assess
the degree of risk inherent in derivative product transactions. 34 The
consensus both among industry leaders and regulators is that no one-not
even the creators of the instrument-can evaluate the true extent of the
risk.'35 Federal Reserve Board Governor John Le Ware noted that in light
of the uncertainty surrounding these instruments, the Federal Reserve and
the FDIC concurred early in 1992 that investment in derivative products,
including swap transactions, is unacceptable for depository institutions.'36
In light of the enormous amount of funds banking institutions currently
commit to swap transactions, any attempt to prevent banks from competing
in the swap market would meet with considerable resistance, and therefore
would never seriously be pursued.
3. SEC Risk-Assessment Rules: A Course for Nonbanking Swap
Dealers
Finally, the SEC has leapt into the fray, adding its own appetizer to the
regulatory po4tpourri. Rules 17h-lT and 17h-2T of the 1934 Act require
broker-dealers (who by definition include only nonbank entities) 137 to
adhere to specific recordkeeping requirements, which include disclosure and
reporting to the SEC of the broker-dealers risk management policy, as well
as certain financial data. 3 ' The goals behind these rules parallel those of
the FDICIA-to assess the risks facing broker-dealers, including the risk of
swap transactions, and to help the SEC handle the failure of a large
investment firm in a manner that will minimize the impact on the global
134. Fed Notice, supra note 123.
135. See supra note 93.
136. Id.
137. "The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank. " Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78(c)(4) (1988) (emphasis added). "The term 'dealer' means any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does
not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either
individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular business." Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(5) (1988) (emphasis added). For further discussion of the relevant
characteristics regarding who constitutes brokers and dealers, see Thomas A. Russo & Joyce P.
Farnsworth, Regulation of Equity Derivatives, in SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1992, supra note
15, at 165, 203-06.
138. SEC Final Temporary Risk Assessment Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 249 (1992).
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financial system. 39  In practice, the SEC rules seek to offer similar
guarantees of capital strength for institutions which the FDICIA does not
govern (e.g., investment banks).
The SEC rules do not intend to regulate swap transactions in any form;
they merely require large investment firms to disclose their swap positions
on a quarterly basis. 40 The SEC plans to monitor the exposure of broker-
dealers carrying an excess of $20 million in capital to excessive interest rate
and credit risk. Presumably, if the risk level surpasses a threshold level of
materiality, the SEC will take measures to force the firm to return to an
acceptable level of risk exposure. Fearing a repeat of the Drexel fiasco, the
SEC is attempting to inhibit the largest financial institutions from leveraging
themselves to such a degree that breaks in the market threaten their
viability. 14  Experts worry that the failure of such institutions would
reverberate throughout the world economy and could create grave
repercussions within the global financial community. 1
42
The SEC is currently considering modification of the Net Capital Rule
to better account for the risks of new financial instruments, including swap
transactions. 4 3 Comments from industry leaders are not expected until the
end of 1993, meaning that final SEC action is unlikely until at least early
1994.'44
4. The Barren Cornucopia: A Summary of the Present State of
Regulation
The issue of which regulatory body possesses jurisdiction over swap
transactions has not been resolved. CME v. SEC indicates that the CFTC
may possess exclusive jurisdiction, but so far that agency has refused to
proclaim firmly that swaps qualify as futures contracts and thus fall squarely
within its domain. Congress has taken an affirmative step by passing the
FTPA, which when coupled with subsequent CFTC rules, fully exempts
swap transactions not traded on organized exchanges from all provisions of
139. New SEC Rules for Brokers'Affiliates Aim to Avoid Repeat of Drexel Problems, [July-Dec]
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 59 at 96 (July 20, 1992) [hereinafter Drexel Problems].
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17h-IT(al)(vii) (1992).
141. Drexel Problems, supra note 139.
142. SEC Proposed Rules: Net Capital Rules, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,486 (May 10, 1993).
143. Id.
144. Derivatives Rule Stalled at the SEC, AM. BANKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 4.
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the CEA and all CFTC regulation. The hands-off approach taken by the
CFTC means that swap transactions are free from regulation. While the
transactions themselves are unregulated, three bodies, each governing a
different group of swap dealers, have penned complementary measures
which seek to ensure that swap dealers maintain sufficient levels of capital
to back their transactions and retain viability in a doomsday scenario. The
BIS Committee, a self-regulatory body of international banks, implemented
minimal capital requirements for banks acting as swap dealers, which reflect
the credit risk banks incur in their swap transactions. The Federal Reserve
adopted these capital requirements for domestic banks acting as swap
dealers and added provisions which also account for interest rate risk.
Finally, the SEC, which has refrained from formally claiming that swaps
constitute securities (allowing it to assert jurisdiction over the instruments),
adopted a rule requiring nonbank swap dealers which possess a certain level
of capital to disclose and to report their swap transactions.
IV. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
The unanimous consensus within the financial community is that the
market for swap transactions and other derivative products will continue to
mushroom and that the complexity of these instruments will continue to
increase. As the notional amount of swap transactions grows, the
ramifications of an adverse market reaction in an unregulated swap market
become increasingly dangerous to the world economy. Further, as swap
participants expand beyond institutional players, and become more widely
accessible to smaller investors, the need for regulation becomes more
pervasive. Little debate would occur if a more cost effective regulatory
system existed that would mitigate the risks inherent in swap transactions
and prevent a doomsday scenario. Unfortunately, no such system exists.
The impossibility of obtaining perfect information about the risk of swap
transactions means that any regulation based on risk factors will be flawed.
However, all effective regulation need not measure risk factors. Antifraud
provisions, for example, do not require perfect risk-based information to be
effective. Further, even somewhat inaccurate risk-based regulation is
desirable if it provides a benefit which exceeds its cost.
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A. Costs of More Stringent Regulation
Adopting a more stringent domestic regulatory structure would impose
two primary costs on swap transactions. First, regulating swaps imposes an
internal cost on each swap transaction. In effect, regulation serves as a tax
on swaps conducted in the United States. The exact impact of the tax
depends on the nature of the regulation. Regardless of its nature, any
regulation which forces the dealer to commit resources it would not
otherwise commit imposes added costs on the dealer. In the absence of
regulation, the rational dealer will expend resources on monitoring its risk
until its marginal costs exceed its marginal benefits-the profit maximizing
level of expenditures. If regulation demands that the dealer expend
resources beyond this level, the cost to the dealer of conducting the swap
transaction increases by the cost of the added burden of regulation. The
difference between the expenditures in the absence of regulation and the
expenditures under regulation constitutes the level of the tax.
Dealers will pass the the increased costs along to consumers in the form
of higher premiums on swap transactions. Since swap transactions
conducted abroad face no regulatory constraints, foreign swap dealers will
possess a cost advantage in the swap market. Customers will shift their
business away from U.S. dealers in order to take advantage of the lower
premiums offered abroad. In addition, the lower profit margins caused by
the regulatory tax would create disincentives to create new financial
products. Since fostering innovative financial instruments is a priority of the
CFTC, 45 further regulation would work against this end. Notably,
coordinated global regulation of swaps would not create any of these ill
effects. The tax of global regulation would be borne equally by all nations
which conduct swaps. While the cost of conducting swaps may increase, all
swap dealers will incur the cost equally. If regulation is truly optimal,
consumers will not mind paying higher premiums in return for added
insurance on their swaps. Thus, profit margins will be unaffected, and no
added disincentives for innovation will be created.
The second cost of regulation is external; namely, the heightened cost
to the agency that performs an additional regulatory function. If the agency
has a fixed budget, the added regulatory burden of swaps will force the
145. See, e.g., Laurie Morse, CFTC Confirmed as US. Futures Market Regulator, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1992, at 29.
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agency to divert resources away from some current uses. If the current uses
confer more benefits than would employing the same funds to regulate
swaps, an external cost results and regulation should not be pursued.
Similarly, if the agency can procure additional funding to support swap
regulation, abandoning the current structure either diverts resources from
other government agencies or increases the tax burden on the public. Either
way, someone bears additional costs. Again, in a paradigm of unified global
regulation, such a problem disappears. Swap dealers, not governments,
would fund the regulatory body. That agency would serve as a protective
feature built into swap transactions. As such, if regulation were optimal,
risk-averse consumers would be willing to pay more to receive the benefits
of regulation.
B. Benefits of a More Stringent Regulatory Regime
In order for regulation to confer any benefits, it must provide a service
which the current regulatory paradigm will not. This Note has mentioned
two flaws with the current approach to swap regulation. First, neither
private swap dealers nor the government agencies charged with setting
minimum capital requirements have conceived a foolproof method of setting
accurate capital floors. The reason behind this failure stems from the
inability of anyone, whether it be regulators or industry experts, to assess the
true nature of the risk. The problem lies in the fact that swap technology
outpaces the ability of anyone to grasp the spectrum of risks associated
with the transactions. Since regulation cannot accelerate the understanding
process, heightened regulation only can delay technological advances in
swaps until they are better understood. If the unknown risks of arcane
swaps truly pose a danger to the consumer and to the market, regulation
should suppress their introduction into the market. Much in the manner as
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) tests new drugs before allowing
them to hit the shelves, perhaps a regulatory body should analyze new
swaps before allowing investment firms to market them.
Swap dealers would argue that swaps are not marketed to the public; in
fact, each swap is a contract with an individual party for a unique product.
Therefore, to regulate such an agreement would be to interfere with the right
of two consenting parties to form a mutual agreement. The parties
recognize that they cannot accurately assess the risk of the transaction, and
they build this uncertainty into the contract price. Further, customers neither
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need nor demand added regulation. Most swap customers are sophisticated
investors 4 6 who have the capability to understand the nature of their
transactions, and as such are able to "fend for themselves."' 47 Nor do
dealers require added regulation. Profit maximizing forces will ensure that
dealers who misconstrue the risk factors will overcompensate for
unquantifiable risk, and will not err in reverse. 4 Thus, even in the
absence of accurate capital requirements, the chance of a dealer failure, and
the ripple effect on the financial markets which accompanies it, is minimal.
Since swaps pose no significant danger to consumers and the marketplace,
restraining new swap transactions until regulators understand the extent of
the risk serves no purpose. Such legislation would merely hamper innovative
instruments from reaching consumers who demand them, which again runs
counter to the CFTC philosophy of promoting product proliferation.
However, the lack of swap regulation serves to exclude unsophisticated
and non-institutional parties from the swap market. While dealers seldom
considered these parties to be swap candidates in the past, increasingly in
the future, dealers looking to expand their customer base will sell smaller,
less sophisticated businesspeople on the benefits of swap transactions.1
49
Certainly these investors require protection no less than do smaller investors
in more traditional securities and commodities, which are heavily regulated.
The second potential problem with the current regulatory structure is an
absence of regulatory certainty regarding instances of fraud in the swap
market. By exempting swaps from regulation, the CFTC intended to
provide "legal certainty" regarding the status of swap transactions." ° The
FTPA and the related CFTC rules achieved legal certainty by eliminating the
legal risk that swap contracts might be overturned on the grounds that as
futures contracts they violate the exchange trading requirement of section
4(a) of the CEA.'5 ' If the exemption did not exist, a finding that one
146. See Hu, supra note 93, at 1459.
147. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (Citing only to the quote, not to the
nature of swap investors. The case stands for the proposition that regulation, by means of the 1933 Act,
is unnecesary if the subjects of the regulation are not in need of protection.)
148. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
149. Congress recognizes that swap consumers "may be reaching the next tier of institutional
investor;" namely, small institutions. House Hearing, supra note I.
150. Vicky Stamas, Commodities Rule Could Energize Trading in Swaps, THE BOND BUYER, Oct.
19, 1992, at 34 (quoting former CFTC chairwoman Wendy Gramm).
151. Robert J. McKay, The Search for Regulatory Certainty, INST'L INVESTOR, Dec. 1992, at
Supp. 9, Supp. 10.
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specific swap transaction qualified as a futures contract would threaten the
viability of the entire swap market, which would result in severe
consequences for the entire banking system. Until legal certainty was
provided, swap participants were forced to factor the risk of such a finding
into the contract price. These increased transactions costs raised the price
of conducting swap agreements both to dealers and end-users. In addition,
the absence of legal certainty scared away risk-averse swap engineers who
feared their new instruments might fail a legal challenge. By injecting legal
certainty into the swap market, the current regulatory regime promotes
innovative product development.
5 2
While recent legislative and CFTC actions impose legal certainty,
lawmakers have failed to address the issue of regulatory certainty. In other
words, the questions of whether and how swaps ultimately should be
regulated and who should regulate them remain unclear. The CFTC has yet
to pronounce firmly that a swap qualifies as a futures contract. The SEC
has expressed no opinion as to whether a swap meets the definition of a
security. As was the case prior to the introduction of legal certainty into the
swap market, a single court holding that swaps belong under the jurisdiction
of either the CFTC or the SEC alone would drastically impact the financial
marketplace. As the regulatory status of swap transactions lies in abeyance,
swap participants incur additional transactions costs. These transaction costs
are not associated with evaluating risk. Instead, the costs stem from the
inability of both parties to form identical expectations as to the
contingencies of the contract. The degree of uncertainty prevents a meeting
of the minds between the two parties since neither can be sure which
agency, if any, will protect the transaction.
The problem of regulatory uncertainty becomes particularly acute
concerning the issue of fraud. Under the current regulatory structure, the
exact manner in which an instance of fraud would be handled is unclear.
To date, no fraud cases have been brought before courts or to the attention
of any regulatory agencies. The CFTC has proclaimed that the antifraud
provisions of the CEA 53 apply to swap transactions. 54 But since the
CEA only applies to instruments defined as futures contracts, if a court
152. Stamas, supra note 150, at 34.
153. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
154. 'Swaps' Market Won't Face Regulation, But Rules Against Fraud, Manipulation Will Apply,
supra note 100, at G5.
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declares a swap not to be a futures contract, the antifraud provisions of the
CEA will not be triggered. Further, the ambiguity of the status of the SEC
in the regulatory paradigm raises questions as to whether the antifraud
provisions of the 1934 Act might also apply.
C. Competing Pressures
Until information barriers for evaluating the risk of swap transactions are
removed, no ideal solution can exist. No one, however, seems to be short
on ideas, many of which can improve the existing structure. Economist
Henry Kaufman proposed a six-point plan for improving the regulatory
system.15  Most notably, the plan provides for the formation of an
international organization to oversee and harmonize the various domestic
regulatory regimes. 6
In the United States, regulation of swaps provides a showcase for the
turf battle between the SEC and the CFTC, causing one commenter to
suggest that the struggle for agency power drives regulatory policy more
than rational design.'57 Another recommends a merger of the two
agencies to provide a unified regulatory approach. 5 For its part, the
CFTC, perhaps in an effort to maintain its livelihood, opposes merger of the
two agencies which would permit a single agency to govern swaps. 159
The CFTC does suggest increased coordination among the relevant
regulatory bodies and favors creating an interagency council to evaluate the
need for additional regulation.' 60 However, the CFTC recommends "no
fundamental [change] in [the] regulatory structure" of swaps.' 6'
Regulators also face competing pressures from swap dealers, who
promote laissez-faire, and futures exchanges, which demand the
155. James P. Kraus, Noted Economist Sounds Warning on Weakness of Swaps Regulation, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 20, 1993, at 30.
156. Id.
157. Hazen, supra note 12, at 1021.
158. Russo & Vinciguerra, supra note 38, at 1495.
159. Lynn Stevens Hume, Futures Commission Calls for Council of Agencies to Scrutinize
Derivatives, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 27, 1993, at 1.
160. Id.
161. Christi Harlan, CFTC Ducks the Issue of How to Regulate Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Oct.
27, 1993, at CI. The CFTC's persistent statements of inaction have been soundly criticized. See Laurie
Morse, Risk and Reward: CFTC Stalls Over Regulation Until Reinforcements Arrive, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
1, 1993, at 20. "The CFTC's fumbling attempts to get its arms around the OTC [swap] market
demonstrate that derivatives regulation is in sad need of realignment." Id.
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classification of swaps as futures contracts. While swap dealers have won
the initial battle, the war has only begun. Futures exchanges are considering
challenging the CFTC exemption for off-exchange swaps. 62 If pressed to
a conclusion, such a suit would force the courts to grapple with and firmly
decide the benchmark issue of whether a swap constitutes a futures contract.
When considering this issue, courts should not only weigh the traditional
factors which qualify an instrument as a futures contract, but they also
should consider the ramifications of a final proclamation that the CFTC
possesses exclusive jurisdiction over the swap transactions. Until a court
renders such a final proclamation, regulatory uncertainty and the transaction
costs which attach to it, cannot be eliminated. In the interim, any agency
assertion of jurisdiction will not mitigate the uncertainty since such a
proclamation would soon be subject to challenge, and prone to reversal, by
a court.
CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, flaws exist in the current regulatory regime. But in
analyzing whether the regime should be altered and more intense regulation
should be pursued, one question of paramount concern is whether changing
the existing structure would improve the current situation. As Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Chairman William Brodsky stated, "when there is an
issue of market safety, people have the tendency to regulate." '63 Before
plunging into regulation, lawmakers should conduct a traditional cost-benefit
analysis to ensure that regulation protects more than amorphous
concerns.'" Added regulation pertaining to evaluation of risk factors
serves no useful end, since regulators themselves cannot accurately assess
the risks of complex swap transactions. Overzealous regulation pursued
unilaterally by the United States serves only to increase internal and external
costs of transactions, reducing incentives for innovation and causing U.S.
swap dealers to lose business to competitors overseas who have the benefit
of less regulated markets.
162. Dingell Rejects Challenge on CFTC Swap Exemptions, DERIVATIVES WEEK, Jan. 11, 1993,
at 1.
163. William Brodsky, Address at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University (C-SPAN
television broadcast, Dec. 17, 1992).
164. Id.
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New York Stock Exchange chairman William Donaldson claims that
"custom made interest rate swaps" pose the greatest risk to orderly markets
worldwide. 65  Yet merely because a risk exists does not mean that
increased regulation-will mitigate the risk. It is easy to endorse free market
economics when no major shocks to the global system have occurred.
However, with the burgeoning popularity of swap transactions, problems are
inevitable. When such problems arise, U.S. regulators should not submit to
political pressures and battles for jurisdiction. A globalized swap market
demands a common global solution. In order to address the problem
effectively, all nations in which swap transactions are conducted must unite
on a single mode of regulation, even if regulation merely takes the form of
laissez-faire.
165. William Donaldson, Chairman, New York Stock Exchange, Address at the JFK School of
Government, Harvard University (C-SPAN television broadcast, Dec. 17, 1992).
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